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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 18-1132 
________________ 
 
ANDRE DENNIS,   
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
 
ADMINISTRATOR NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. No. 2-14-cv-02136)  
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on September 12, 2019 
 
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 13, 2019) 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
                                                          
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Andre Dennis (“Dennis”) appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We granted a certificate of appealability (COA) 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) on the issue of whether “counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to seek suppression of appellant’s statement to police on the ground 
that officers should have re-administered the Miranda warnings after appellant spoke 
with his brother/co-defendant.”1  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order, denying Dennis’ habeas petition. 
I.2 
On April 20, 2007, Dennis pleaded guilty in the New Jersey Superior Court Law 
Division in Hudson County, New Jersey to one count of first-degree aggravated 
manslaughter.  On July 22, 2008, he was sentenced to 18 years in prison. 
 The matter on appeal concerns only the nature and circumstances of Dennis’ 
interrogation leading up to his confession.  Police arrested Dennis and read him his 
Miranda rights.3  During the interrogation, Dennis initially denied shooting the victim, 
and signed a form waiving his Miranda rights.  He told the police “a lot of people been 
bothering me” and “I want to go to sleep.”  Police then allowed Dennis to sleep.  During 
Dennis’ interrogation, police simultaneously questioned Dennis’ brother, Antoine, in a 
separate room.  Antoine confessed but did not identify the second shooter and asked to 
speak with Dennis.  Police woke Dennis and allowed the two brothers to speak in a 
                                                          
1 App. 35.   
2 Since we write solely for the parties, we limit our review and analysis to only the 
relevant issues and facts.   
3
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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separate room without the police present.  After speaking with Antoine for ten minutes, 
Dennis confessed and provided a statement that he was the second shooter.   
Dennis claims that after he spoke with his brother Antoine, police should have re-
administered his Miranda warnings and that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights were violated due to ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to pursue 
suppression of his statement to police.  Dennis asserts that had the request for suppression 
of the statement been made, it would have been granted by the Court, and he would not 
have pleaded guilty.  He also claims that counsel’s ineffectiveness was clear, and that 
appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise this claim on appeal 
in the State Courts.  
After his sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, Dennis filed for Post-Conviction 
Relief (PCR) in the Hudson County Law Division.  On August 15, 2011, that court 
rejected all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that they “lack[ed] merit, 
as the only basis for the suppression of his statements were that he had said ‘a lot of 
people’ had been ‘bothering’ him after he was taken into custody.”4  Petitioner then filed 
an appeal in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division on December 14, 2011 
alleging numerous claims.  The claims for ineffective assistance were once again denied.  
Subsequently, Dennis sought PCR in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and on February 
4, 2014, his petition was denied.   
                                                          
4  State v. Dennis, 2013 WL 2459864, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 10, 2013).  
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On April 3, 2014, Dennis filed his § 2254 petition in the U.S. District Court.  In 
his petition, among other claims, he asserted ineffective assistance of counsel both at the 
trial court and state appellate court levels.  Finding his claims without merit, the District 
Court denied Dennis’ habeas petition and request for a COA.  With respect to Dennis’ 
claim of ineffective assistance for failure to pursue suppression of his confession, the 
District Court concluded there was no basis for the suppression of his confession, and 
therefore, his counsel could not have rendered ineffective assistance in that regard.5   
Neither the District Court nor the New Jersey Appellate Court directly addressed 
whether counsel’s assistance was ineffective specifically for failure to move to suppress 
Dennis’ statement because the officers should have re-administered Miranda warnings to 
Dennis after he spoke with his brother Antoine.  We granted a COA to examine this 
single issue.6   
II. 
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. The District Court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA), where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the State 
Courts, the District Court shall not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless 
the State Court adjudication:  
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
                                                          
5 Dennis v. D'Ilio, 2017 WL 6372239, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2017). 
6 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). 
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States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.7 
 
If a State Court did not adjudicate a claim on the merits, we apply the pre-AEDPA 
standard “reviewing pure legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.”8  
Under § 2254(e)(1), we presume that the State Court's factual determinations are correct 
“unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.”9  
Both the District Court and the State Court were silent on the issue of Dennis’ 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim specifically related to Dennis’ assertion that he 
should have been re-administered his Miranda rights after he spoke with Antoine.  Under 
Johnson v. Williams and AEDPA, a State Court does not need to explicitly address each 
and every federal claim raised.  “When a state court rejects a federal claim without 
expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the federal 
claim was adjudicated on the merits.”10  In order for a claim to be adjudicated on the 
merits, the Court must evaluate it “based on the intrinsic right and wrong of the matter as 
determined by matters of substance.”11  The Williams presumption can “in some limited 
circumstances be rebutted.”12   
                                                          
7 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).   
8 Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
9 Id. 
10 Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301 (2013). 
11 Id. at 302–03. 
12 Id. at 301. 
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Dennis attempts to rebut this presumption by asserting that the State Court did not 
adjudicate on the merits his specific claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to 
the suppression of his statement due to failure to provide new Miranda warnings after his 
conversation with Antoine.  Since we conclude that appellant’s claim is without merit, 
even under de novo review, we need not address whether the State Court adjudicated the 
claim on the merits for purposes of § 2254. 
III.  
Although it is undisputed that Miranda warnings are essential during police 
interrogations, police are not required to re-warn suspects at multiple points throughout 
the interrogation.13  The Supreme Court in Wyrick v. Fields held that it is unreasonable 
for police to be required to issue Miranda warnings when there is no “significant change 
in the character of the interrogation.”14 
In United States v. Pruden, this Court held that the determination of whether 
Miranda warnings must be re-administered requires answers to two questions: 
(1) At the time the Miranda warnings were provided, did the 
defendant know and understand his rights? (2) Did anything 
occur between the warnings and the statement, whether the 
passage of time or other intervening event, which rendered the 
defendant unable to consider fully and properly the effect of an 
exercise or waiver of those rights before making a statement to 
law enforcement officers?15 
 
                                                          
13 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 386 (2010).   
14 Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 47 (1982). 
15 United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Vasquez, 889 F. Supp. 171, 177 (M.D. Pa. 1995)).   
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When analyzing the circumstances of Dennis’ interrogation and statement under the 
Pruden framework, we find his argument that he should have been re-issued Miranda 
warnings after he spoke with his brother to be unconvincing. 
First, as the State Appellate Court and the District Court noted, Dennis was read 
Miranda rights, he signed the Miranda waiver form, and he voluntarily gave a recorded 
statement to police.  Dennis gave a voluntary and deliberate waiver with the awareness of 
his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.16   
Second, breaking down the series of events leading up to his confession, it cannot 
be said that his conversation with Antoine left Dennis unable to understand his rights and 
the effect of his waiver.  While there were interruptions in Dennis’ interrogation, which 
included allowing him to speak with his brother alone for approximately ten minutes, 
examining all the circumstances of the interrogation, there is no indication that Dennis no 
longer understood his Miranda rights and the consequences of his waiver after speaking 
with his brother.  The minor changes throughout the interrogation such as Dennis’ 
relocation to a different room, time to rest, and a conversation with Antoine “would not 
have caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and which he had 
understood moments before.”17 
In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Dennis must 
show that 1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness” and 2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
                                                          
16 Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 383.    
17 Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 49.   
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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”18  The 
standard for professional competence is broad, and when examining claims of ineffective 
assistance, courts are to presume that counsel exercised reasonable professional 
judgment.19 
Examining the totality of the evidence surrounding Dennis’ confession through the 
lens of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyrick v. Fields, and this Court’s decision in 
Pruden, we conclude that Dennis’ argument fails to meet the Strickland standard of 
ineffective assistance.  Because Dennis gave a voluntary and deliberate waiver of his 
rights, and there is no indication that Dennis’ conversation with his brother caused him to 
forget his rights, police were not required to re-read Dennis his Miranda warnings after 
he spoke with his brother.  Therefore, counsel’s decision not to pursue a motion to 
suppress did not fall below the standard of reasonableness.  
Additionally, given the circumstances of the confession, we cannot agree that had 
counsel raised a motion to suppress, it would have been granted and in turn, he would not 
have pled guilty or the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.  
Accordingly, we also conclude that appellate counsel did not render ineffective assistance 
on Dennis’ State Court appeal, and the Order entered by the District Court will be 
affirmed.   
                                                          
18 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).    
19 Id. at 690.   
